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The Legal Minimum Drinking Age in Texas: 
Effects of an Increase from 18 to 19 
Alexander C. Wagenaar and Richard G. Maybee 
Effects on motor vehicle crash involvement of raising the legal drinking 
age in Texas from 18 to 19 were examined, using an interrupted time-series 
design. Rates of single-vehicle-nighttime (SVN) and non-SVN crashes per 
100,000 licensed drivers from 1978 through 1984 were examined for three 
levels of crash severity (serious injury, minor injury, property damage only) 
and four age groups (16-17, 18, 19-20, 21 and over). Resul’s revealed signifi- 
cant reductions in SVN crashes for the 18-year-old target population across 
all levels of crash severity: serious injury, down 10.8 % ; minor injury, down 
14.3% ; and property damage only, down 12.8%. In comparison, no signifi- 
cant changes in S/N crashes among drivers age 21 and over were found. 
When the effects of macroeconomic conditions on crash rates were con- 
trolled statistically, no change in the estimated effect of the legal age law 
was seen. It is clear that the l-year increase in legal age in Texas had a 
significant effect on youth crash involvement. 
Over half of the states in the U. S. lowered 
their minimum legal drinking age between 
1970 and 1973. After these changes, several 
studies found significant increases in youth 
alcohol-related traffic crashes, although 
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specific results varied depending on jurisdic- 
tions studied and methods used (Cucchiaro, 
Ferreira, & Sicherman, 1974; Douglass, 
Filkins, & Clark, 1974; Whitehead, Craig, 
Langford et al., 1975; Williams, Rich, Za- 
dor, et al., 1975). Whitehead (1977) critical- 
ly reviewed these early studies and conclud- 
ed that significant increase in youth crash 
involvement attributable to the lowered age 
was consistently found in those studies using 
controlled methods. 
In the late 1970s and earlv 1980s a num- 
ber of states reversed earlier actions and 
raised their legal minimum drinking age. 
Several factors appear to have encouraged 
this trend. First, methodologically sound re- 
search indicated substantial negative public 
health effects of the lower drinking age. Sec- 
ond, a number of government agencies, 
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public interest organizations, and citizen 
activist groups focused attention on the 
drinking/driving problem (for example, The 
Center for Science in the Public Interest, 
Remove Intoxicated Drivers, Mothers 
Against Drunk Drivers, Students Against 
Drunk Driving, National Council on Alco- 
holism, National Transportation Safety 
Board, and The Presidential Commission on 
Drunk Driving). Third, mass media atten- 
tion to drinking and driving problems in- 
creased substantially. Finally, a trend to- 
ward more conservative political and social 
policy may be creating an environment con- 
ducive to such increased restrictions on 
youth. 
In the early 198Os, a number of studes 
were done that evaluated the short-term ef- 
fects of raising the legal drinking age on 
youth crash involvement. Significant reduc- 
tions in alcohol-related or single-vehicle- 
nighttime (SVN) crash involvement of 10 to 
30 % were typically found among those ages 
directly affected by the law (Hingson, 
Scotch, Mangione et al., 1983; Klein, 1981; 
FVagenaar, 1983; Williams, Zador, Harris, 
et al., 1983). 
Not all research on the effects of increas- 
ing the minimum drinking age has shown 
consistent results. A 1986 study by Males, 
examining a number of states, reported a 
6% decrease in fatal crashes among drivers 
affected by raised minimum drinking age 
laws and a 15 % increase in fatalities among 
drivers in their first year after reaching the 
legal purchase age in states with raised 
drinking age laws. Williams (1986), howev- 
er, points out that there are serious method- 
ological problems with the Males study. 
A study by Bolotin and DeSario (1985) 
compared 15 states that had raised their al- 
cohol purchase age during 1979-83 with 
states that had not changed the purchase 
age during that period. The study used data 
on fatalities in crashes with police-reported 
alcohol involvement supplied by the Nation- 
al Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
(NHTSA) Fatal Accident Reporting System 
(FARS). Bolotin and DeSario compared the 
change states with the nonchange states 2 
years before and 2 years after the change 
date and found “no consistent pattern of de- 
crease across the change states that can be 
attributed to the rise in the drinking age.” 
Due to differences in the way states report 
alcohol involvement, however, NHTSA 
prints a warning on each page of the FARS 
data which indicates that they are not ap- 
propriate for comparing alcohol involve- 
ment in FARS on a state-by-state basis. De- 
spite this warning, Bolotin and DeSario 
used these data for their analysis. In a cri- 
tique of the Bolotin and DeSario study, Wil- 
liams, Zador, and Wells (1986) suggest that 
“study results were derived from a measure 
of alcohol involvement in crashes that is use- 
less for analytic purposes. The result is that 
their analysis produces inappropriate and 
uninterpretable comparisons.” 
It is clear that findings vary depending on 
jurisdictions studied and methods used. De- 
spite this, the pattern of findings across the 
majority of sound methodological studies 
indicates that, in most jurisdictions, an in- 
crease in legal drinking age from 18 or 19 to 
21 is followed by a decrease in the numbers 
of young drivers involved in alcohol-related 
traffic crashes. 
The presumed mechanism for a reduction 
in traffic crashes is a change in the amount 
and pattern of alcohol consumption among 
youth. Surveys of self-reported drinking 
practices have identified significant changes 
in several dimensions of drinking behavior 
among young people in states that recently 
raised the legal age for alcohol use (Hingson 
et al., 1983; Williams & Lillis, 1986). 
Based on evidence available to date, nu- 
merous agencies and organizations have ad- 
vocated a uniform national drinking age of 
21 (American College of Emergency Physi- 
cians, 1986; American Medical Association, 
1983; National Council on ‘Alcoholism, 
1982; National Safety Council, 1985; Na- 
tional Transportation Saftey Board, 1983; 
Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, 
1983). In 1984 the U. S. Congress passed the 
Uniform Minimum Drinking Age Act; be- 
ginning in 1986, this law withholds a frac- 
tion of federal highway trust funds from 
states without a minimum drinking age of 21. 
After the national law was passed, several 
states increased their legal age to 21 to avoid 
losing federal highway funds.’ However, 
I.&s of January 1986, there were only 13 states with 
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some states do not fully support a legal age 
of 21, even though they have passed legisla- 
tion to avoid the penalities of lost federal 
funding. For example, Texas passed legisla- 
tion in 1985 that increased its legal drinking 
age from 19 to 21. However, the law remains 
in effect only as long as federal sanctions for 
noncompliance continue. 
In summary, there is considerable evi- 
dence that a higher legal age for purchase 
and consumption of alcoholic beverages is 
associated with lower rates of traffic crash 
involvement among young drivers. Many 
states have raised their drinking ages, and 
increasing proportions of U. S. youth do not 
have legal access to alcoholic beverages until 
age 21. Nevertheless, consensus on the exact 
magnitude of the expected beneficial effects 
of higher drinking ages has not been 
achieved, and the debate continues on 
whether the public health benefits of higher 
legal ages are large enough to warrant re- 
stricting youth drinking. 
The present study was designed to pro- 
vide additional information for consider- 
ation in these policy debates. Most studies to 
date have focused on a change in legal age 
from 18 to 20 or 21. One exception was a 
study of the short-term effects of Ontario’s 
increase in legal age from 18 to 19 (Vingilis 
& Smart, 1981). In that study no significant 
reductions were found in drinking/driving 
convictions or monthly crash fatalities 
among 18-year-old drivers. The Ontario law 
included a grandfather clause for those al- 
ready 18 when the law was passed. A survey 
of high-school-age youth conducted 2 
months after the Ontario law was passed 
and a survey of high school administrators 6 
months after the law was passed found lim- 
ited changes in the drinking behavior of the 
target age group as a result of the law. 
The goal of the current study was to mea- 
sure the effects of a l-year increase in the 
legal age for purchase of alcoholic beverages 
on youth crash involvement in Texas. Texas 
raised its legal age for drinking from 18 to 
19 for all types of alcoholic beverages effec- 
tive September 1, 1981. The short- and in- 
legal drinking ages below 21 (National Safety Council, 
personal communication, January 17, 1986). 
termediate-term effects of that law were as- 
sessed, using data on motor vehicle crashes 
occurring between January 1978 and De- 
cember 1984. Data were not yet available to 
measure the effects of the 1985 increase in 
legal age from 19 to 21. 
METHOD 
Design 
A nonequivalent multiple time-series de- 
sign was used. The design provides high lev- 
els of internal validity, strengthening inter- 
pretation of the results in causal terms 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). A time-series de- 
sign is the strongest design possible when 
random assignment cannot be used and ex- 
tensive longitudinal data are available. The 
multiple time-series design employed in this 
study compares a series of observations over 
time for a specified population affected by a 
policy change (treatment group) with a con- 
trol series of observations not affected by the 
policy change (comparison group). 
Based on previous research, we hypothe- 
sized that there would be a reduction in 
traffic crash involvement among 18 years 
old in Texas following the increase in legal 
drinking age from 18 to 19. Because reduced 
accessibility of alcohol to 18 year olds may 
also make it more difficult for 16 and 17 
years olds to obtain alcohol, the crash in- 
volvement experience of underage drinkers 
before and after the drinking age was raised 
was also examined. Two comparison groups 
of drivers not directly affected by the legal 
age change were also analyzed, drivers age 
19 and 20 and those age 21 and over. 
It was hypothesized that an increase in 
the legal drinking age would reduce crash 
involvement among alcohol-impaired young 
drivers, but would have no effect on the 
numbers of nondrinking young drivers in- 
volved in crashes. Therefore, within each of 
the four age groups, crashes likely to involve 
alcohol were compared with those not likely 
to involve alcohol. The comparison of these 
two categories of crashes helped determine 
whether observed changes in numbers of 
crashes were due to the drinking age change 
or other coincident factors. 
Because of the unreliability of police re- 
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ports concerning the involvement of alcohol 
in traffic crashes, an indirect measure of al- 
cohol involvement was used. Single-vehicle 
nighttime (8 p.m. to 5 a.m.) crashes have a 
high probability of alcohol involvement. 
Cerreffi (1983) examined fatal crash data 
from 29 states and found that 68% of SW 
crashes involve alcohol-impaired drivers, 
whereas non-SVN crashes have a signifi- 
cantly lower probability of involving aico- 
hoi. If increasing the legal drinking age in 
Texas reduced alcohol-related crashes 
among youth, we would expect to see larger 
declines in youth SVN crashes than in youth 
non-SVN crashes. 
SVN crashes are not a prefect measure of 
alcohol-involved crashes, however, because 
a significant proportion of SVN crashes do 
not involve alcohol, and a number of non- 
SVN crashes do involve alcohol. Some scien- 
tists studying the effects of raised legal 
drinking ages have argued for analyses of 
tota crash involvement by age, avoiding 
problems both with police data on alcohol 
and with measurement error associated 
with surrogate measures (Cook & Tauchen, 
1984; Saffer, Grossman et al., 1985). Al- 
though such an approach is reasonable, it 
may provide less statistical power than an 
approach examining SVN versus non-SVN 
crashes. The research design must provide 
sufficient statistical power to detect the 
magnitude of the policy effect anticipated. 
For example, if alcohol-related injury-pro- 
ducing crashes decline 10 % following a pol- 
icy change, and 25% of all injury-produc- 
ing crashes involve alcohol, the expected 
decrease in total crash involvement is 2.5 % . 
With many research designs and analytic 
methods a 2.5% change would not be con- 
sidered statistically significant. AS a result, 
one might incorrectly conclude that the pol- 
icy change had no effect. To reduce this very 
risk of making a Type 11 error, we examined 
SVN and non-SVN crash involvment sepa- 
rately. 
An important reason for using the SVN 
surrogate measure as opposed to police-re- 
ported alcohol involvement is its reliability 
over time. Longitudinal consistency of the 
dependent variable is particularly impor- 
tant for time-series designs (Kendall, 1976). 
Any change in the measurement process 
may be confounded with a change in crash 
rates attributable to the policv change un- 
der examination. It is very unlikely that re- 
porting to the time of a crash or the number 
of vehicles involved changed between 1978 
and 1984. Thus, the indirect indicator SVN 
is a more reliable alternative than reported 
alcohol involvement based on the subjective 
observations of investigating police officers. 
Use of SVN crashes as a surrogate for alco- 
hol-related crashes is well established in the 
traffic safety literature (Voaq 1985). 
Within the four age groups and within 
the two categories of SVN and non-SVN 
crashes, comparisons were made across 
three levels of crash severity. The first level, 
seriotrs injury, consisted of crashes in vvhich 
there was at Ieast une fatality or incapacitat- 
ing injury. The second, minor injury, con- 
sisted of crashes causing nonincapacitating 
or possible injuries. The third, property 
damage only, consisted of crashes that only 
caused property damage, with no injuries 
reported. These categories were analyzed 
separately for two reasons. First, the quality 
of the data on traffic crashes v-aries by crash 
severity. If a crash only causes property 
damage, however, it may not be reported to 
police and therefore not be recorded in the 
data files used here. Because of a lower level 
of confidence in the property-damage crash 
data, they were not combined with the data 
from minor and serious crashes. Thus, we 
avoided having propeq-damage-only crashes 
skew the overall resuhs. 
A second reason for examining crash se- 
verity is the possibility that increasing the 
legal drinking age has differential effects by 
crash severity. Perhaps the young people 
who are least observant of legal drinking 
age restrictions are also those who have a 
higher probability of involvement in a seri- 
ous crash. If so, increasing the legal age may 
have a larger effect in reducing minor 
crashes than serious crashes. 
Police judgments of crash injury severity 
are far from perfect, and a significant pro- 
portions of injuries are not recorded by po- 
iice (Barancik & Fife, 1985; Creenblatt, 
Merrin, Morganstein et al., 1981). Never- 
theless, police records are adequate for a 
broad ordinal grouping of injury severity, as 
used here. Furthermore, there is no evi- 
dence that the quality of injury reporting 
changed substantially during the time peri- 
od under study. 
Finally, to control for changes over time 
in the numbers of drivers in each age group, 
rates of crash involvement per 100,000 li- 
censed drivers were analyzed. Descriptive 
statistics for the major study variables are 
shown in Table 1. 
Analyses 
Effects of raising the minimum drinking 
age in Texas from 18 to 19 were examined 
using Box-Jenkins interrupted time-series in- 
tervention analyses (Box & Jenkins, 1976). 
This method uses iterative Auto-Regressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model 
identification, estimation, and evaluation 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTlVE STATISTICS FOR MAJOR VARIABLES 
CRASHES PEB 1@,,000 LICENSED DRIVEXS 


























Property damage only 
21 and over SVN 
Serious injury 
iMinor injury 




Property damage only 
1.41 13.61 7.57 2.67 
11.84 51.27 26.58 8.05 
29.66 93.70 54.59 15.30 
14.36 57.26 38.11 IO.16 
32.70 107.13 62.16 17.20 
326.83 1002.90 639.75 160.75 
2.61 21.49 11.68 3.87 
23.31 63.82 40.80 8.59 
44.19 113.06 X.00 15.05 
25.41 66.63 AS.17 9.42 
49.16 130.16 S6.69 17.28 
526.65 1092.02 SO392 115.53 
7.57 16.19 ll.i7 2.06 
28.95 50.49 38.86 4.51 
46.85 88.70 65.74 8.84 
26.47 59.94 43.03 7.54 
75.07 131.17 99.98 11.20 
475.65 887.18 672.61 89.68 
2.16 4.01 3.13 0.35 
8.05 11.77 9.61 0.75 
12.68 22.73 Ii.27 2.07 
13.37 22.56 19.15 1.89 
15.11 26.13 20.40 2.13 
248.29 415.42 320.56 38.49 
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techniques for analyzing time-series data 
and can control for a wide variety of trend, 
seasonal, and other autocorrelation patterns. 
The form of the general seasonal ARIMA 
model is shown in Figure 1. Compared to 
alternative analytic strategies, the Box- 
Jenkins methods more accurately account 
for time-series data regularities, as evi- 
denced by lower residual error variances 
(McCleary & Hay, 1980; Vigderhous, 1977). 
Most models used in this study were first- 
order moving average, first-order seasonal 
moving average models operating on the 
seasonal differences of log-transformed 
crash rates. Step functions were added to 
the ARIMA models to estimate the effects of 
the drinking age intervention while control- 
ling for cycles and other long-term patterns 
in the crash time series. All percent change 
estimates reported below are based on such 
intervention models. The estimates repre- 
sent the percent of change in the crash rate 
from the level expected if the drinking age 
had not been increased. 
Because the models are intrinsically non- 
linear, the Gauss-Marquardt method imple- 
mented in the computer program BMD2T 
was used to estimate the parameters (Dixon, 
Brown, Engelman et al,, 1983). Each model 
was carefully evaluated in terms of the 
mutiple criteria set forth by Box and Jenkins 
(1976). When inadequacies were found, the 
model was respecified, reestimated, and re- 
evaluated until a parsimonious model was 
obtained that adequately accounted for all 
of the significant autocorrelation patterns in 
the original series. 
RESULTS 
Significant reductions in the rate of SW 
crash involvement per 100,000 18-year-old 
licensed drivers were found at all levels of 
crash severity (Table 2). After the legal 
drinking age was increased from 18 to 19, 
serious-injury crashes among l&year-old 
drivers declined 10.8% (Figure 2), minor- 
injury crashes declined 11.3% (Figure 3), 
and property-damage-only crashes declined 
12.8% (Figure 4). Similar decreases were 
found for SVN crash involvement among 
16-17-year-old drivers, with serious-injury 
crashes down 7.8 % (Figure 5), minor-injury 
crashes down 11.2 % (Figure 6), and proper- 
ty-damage-only crashes down 15.8% (Fig- 
ure 7). In contrast to drivers age 18 and un- 
der, those age 19 and over experienced no 
significant change in rate of SVN crash in- 
volvement based on our criteria of .05 
probability level, one-tailed test. Using a 
liberal significance level of .lO, one might 
consider the 4.5% decline in serioLts-injury 
crashes and 7.8 % decline in property-dam- 
age-only crashes among 19 and 20-year-old 
drivers evidence of a real decline, Even with 
such a liberal significance level, however, 
drivers age 21 and over experienced no 
change in SVN crash involvement at the 
time Texas raised its legal drinking age from 
18 to 19. The significant reductions in SVN 
crash involvement among 16-18 year olds 
following implementation of the 19-year- 
old drinking law, with no comparable re- 
ductions among drivers 21 and over, in- 
dicate that the new law was primarily, 
FIGURE 1 
GENERAL SEASONAL ARIMA MODEL WITH TRANSFER FUNCTIOS 
(i-e,w . . . 8,B‘Q) (l-&B- . . . &,B$I, + ix (w,,-w,B- . . . w,B) 
” = (l-4@- . . . (P&V’) (l-#IB- . . . #,,BL’) (1-B)” (1-B)” + (l-&B- . . . 6,Br) - “‘-“’ 
p = order of the auto-regressive process 
d = degree of nonseasonal differencing 
q = order of the moving-average process 
P = order of the seasonal auto-regressive process 
I2 = degree of seasonal differencing 
Q = order of the seas04 moving average process 
s = seasonal span 
QI, to 0, = seasonal auto-regressive parameters 
4, to 4, = regular auto-regressive parameters 
O,to 8o = seasonal moving-average parameters 
0, to 19,, = regular moving-average parameters 
ut = random (white noise) error component 
o! = constant 
I3 = backshift operator such that B(q) equals zt_, 
w, too, = transfer function shift parameters 
6, to 6, = transfer function memory parameters 
I, = step (or pulse) function 
b = delay parameter 
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TABLE 2 
CHANGES IN IMOTOR VEHICLE CRASH INVOLVEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH 
RAISING THE LEGAL MINIMUM DRINKING AGE IN TEXAS: TIME-SERIES MODELING RESULTS 
CRASH ADJUSTED olo 
ACE TYPE R? t-RATIO CHANGE 
16-17 SVN 
Serious injury 0.58 1.78 - 7.8’ 
Minor injury 0.84 3.41 - 11.2 
Property damage only 0.86 7.71 - 15.8’ 
Non-SVN 
Serious injury 0.83 1.62 -4.3 
Minor injury 0.86 7.17 - 14.7 




Serious injury 0.51 1.74 - 10.8’ 
,Minor injury 0.66 4.88 - 14.3’ 
Property damage only 0.66 1.71 - 12.8’ 
Non-SVN 
Serious injury 0.63 3.03 -8.1’ 
Minor injury 0.74 1.43 -9.7 
Property damage only 0.82 0.84 - 
SVN 
Serious injury 0.26 1.41 - 4.5 
Minor injury 0.16 0.35 - 
Property damage only 0.57 1.55 - 7.8 
Non-SVN 
Serious injury 0.69 3.91 -8.1’ 
Minor injury 0.31 0.52 - 
Property damage only 0.84 0.15 - 
21 and Over SVN 
Serious injury 
Minor injury 
Property damage only 
Non-SVN 
0.58 0.76 - 
0.49 0.24 - 
0.69 0.47 
Serious injury 07-l 0.97 - 
Minor injury 0.69 , 0.80 - 
Property damage only 0.86 0.08 - 
Note. Calculations based on crash rates per 100,000 licensed drivers. 
*Percent change is significantly different from zero: p< .05: one-tailed test. 
responsible for the 8 to 16% declines ob- 
served among teenagers. 
An alternative method for estimating the 
effects of the raised drinking age is examina- 
tion of relative rates. Relative rates of SVN 
crash involvement were derived by dividing 
the rate of SVN crashes among 18-year-old 
drivers by the rate among those age 21 and 
over for each crash severity category. This 
rate controls for changes in crash involve- 
ment due to factors that are not age-specif- 
ic. Time-series modeling results revealed sig- 
nificant declines in SVN crash involvement 
among 18-year-old drivers relative to those 
age 21 and over. Specifically, the relative 
rate of serious-injury crashes declined 9.5 % 
(t = 1.84), minor-injury crashes declined 
7.6% (t = 2.32), and property-damage-only 
crashes declined 7.8% (t = 2.69). 
Reductions in the rate of non-SVN crash 
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FIGURE 2 
RATE OF SVN SERIOUS-INJURY CRASHES PER 
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FIGURE 3 
RATE OF SVN MINOR-INJURY CRASHES PER 
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FIGURE 4 
RATE OF SVN PROPERTY-DAMAGE-ONLY CRASHES PER 
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involvement among 18-year-old drivers 
were consistently smaller than reductions in 
SVN crash involvement (Table 2). This pat- 
tern is consistent with the hypothesized ef- 
fect of the legal age and the assumption that 
SVN crashes are more likely to involve alco- 
hol than non-SW crashes. 
Results indicated that 19- and 20-vear-old 
drivers may have experienced a slight de- 
cline in crash involvement at the time the 
drinking age was increased. The evidence 
for this decline is weak, with only the 8.1% 
decrease in non-SVN crashes significant at 
p< .05 and nonsignificant decreases in 
SVN crashes for two of the three severity 
categories examined (Table 2). However, if 
19- and 20-year-old drivers experienced 
crash reductions at the time the legal age 
was increased from 18 to 19, perhaps part of 
the decline in crash involvement among 18- 
year-old drivers was due to the same fac- 
tor(s) that caused the declines among those 
19 and 20. One important factor known to 
influence driving patterns and aggregate 
crash rates is the state of the economy (Wag- 
enaar, 1984). To ensure that the observed 
crash reductions among 18-year-old motor- 
ists were not partially due to coincident 
changes in macroeconomic conditions, ad- 
ditional time-series models were developed 
including economic indicators as covariates. 
The time-series model for SVN crash in- 
volvement among 18-year-old drivers is 
shown in Equation 1 of Figure 8. Standard 
errors are shown below each parameter esti- 
mate. Converting the - 0.11 estimate of the 
intervention effect (based on natural loga- 
rithm transformation of the dependent vari- 
able) to a percent change produces the 
10.8 % decrease listed in Table 2. A new 
model for SVN serious-injuT crash rate 
among drivers age 18 was then developed, 
including the industrial index of production 
for Texas as a covariate. The lag structure 
for the relationship of the production index 
on crash rates was based on analyses of the 
cross-correlation function for those two 
variables. Cross-correlations at lags 5 and 7 
months were the only ones that approached 
significance and were therefore included. 
Final estimation results produced the model 
shown in Equation 2 of Figure 8, in which I, 
represents a step function at September 
1981 when the legal drinking age was raised 
and X, represents the industrial production 
index in Texas. 
Two features of this model are notewor- 
thy. First, the production index covariate 
had no significant relationship to the rate of 
SVN serious-injury crashes among 18-year- 
old drivers. Second, and more importantly, 
inclusion of the production index covariate 
produced virtually no change in the legal 
age intervention effect ( - 0.11 in Equation 
1 and 7 0.12 in Equation 2). The analyses 
were repeated using the unemployment rate 
as the covariate. The result \vas the model 
shown in Equation 3 of Figure 8, in which I, 
FIGURE 8 
TI,ME-SERIES MODELS 
INCORPORATING ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1. LnY,= 








(1 + .0922B - .829B”)u, 
(1-B”) - 
.12I, (- .745B’ - .775B’)X, 
(.0672) (. 052) (. 107) (1.538) (1.551) 
LnY,= 
( - .835B”) (1 + .190B)u, 
(1-B”) 
_ .131 + 27 x 
I. f 
(.046) (.117) (.099) (.219) 
\Vinter 1986Nolume 17Number 4 17.5 
represents a step function at September 
1981 when the legal drinking age was raised 
and S, represents the unemployment rate in 
Texas. 
No significant effect of the unemploy- 
ment covariate was found, and virtually no 
change in the estimated effect of the legal 
age change ( - O.lf in Equation f versus 
- 9.13 in Equation 3) was evident. These 
results clearly demonstrate that the reduc- 
tion in rate of SVN serious-injury crashes 
among l&year-old drivers at the time the 
drinking age was increased is not attribut- 
able to corresponding changes in economic 
conditions. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The findings support the hypothesis that 
the increase in legal age in Texas was asso- 
ciated with a decrease in youth crash in- 
volvement. Statistically significant declines 
for all three levels of crash severity were 
found only among drivers age 18 and under 
(who were expected to be influenced by the 
legal change) and only for SVN crashes 
(which have a higher probability of involv- 
ing alcohol). No significant decreases in any 
crash category occurred among drivers age 
21 and over at the time the drinking age was 
raised. Statistical controls for changes in 
macroeconamic conditions, as measured by 
the industrial index of production and the 
rate of unemployment, had no effect on the 
magnitude or significance of the estimated 
impact of changing the legal drinking age. 
Results of the current study support the 
contention that efforts to prevent alcohol- 
related motor vehicle crashes among youth 
should focus on changes in broader social 
and policy environments, not on attempts to 
modify the behavior of individual drinking 
drivers. This is also supported by recent 
studies of the longer-term effects of raised 
purchase ages (Arnoid, 1985; DuMouchel, 
Wihiams, & Zador, 1985; Wagenaar, 19%) 
and by studies of other public policies con- 
cerning young drivers. Effective prevention 
tools reduce the number of people in high- 
risk groups and reduce the number of occa- 
sions of high-risk activities. The amount of 
youth dr~~king~dr~~ng can be reduced by 
increasing the legal driving age (Williams, 
Karpf, & Zador. 1983). The amount of 
youth driving can be reduced through cur- 
few hours, requirements for adult supervi- 
sion, or other restrictions in opportunities to 
drive (Preusser, Williams, Zador et al., 
1982). All of these policies reduce aggregate 
exposure to risk of involvement in an alco- 
hoi-related crash. Such policies also reduce 
the privileges of a single age group, while 
not directly affecting other age groups, such 
as those age 21 and 24, who are significantly 
overrepresented among alcohol-impaired 
crash-involved drivers. 
Although not directly examined in this 
paper, an alternative policy that may have a 
large effect on youth drinking/driving is in- 
creasing the price of alcohol. .I price policy 
would apply to all drinkers and not be limit- 
ed to a single age group. The effects of price 
changes on youth drinking have received 
relatively little research attention, with the 
notable exception of Grossman and as- 
sociates (Grossman, Coate, & Arluck, in 
press; Saffer, Grossman et al., 1985). Saffer, 
Grossman et al. conducted detailed com- 
parisons of the estimated effects of changes 
in alcohol excise taxes with estimated effects 
of a national drinking age of 21. Results in- 
dicated modest increases in alcohol taxes 
would reduce youth alcohol consumption 
more than a national uniform legal drinking 
age of 21. Xncreasing aicohol taxes, and con- 
sequently alcohol prices, as a way to reduce 
alcohol-related problems has a number of 
advantages, First, the excise tax is easily 
manipulated via public policy, Second, it is 
not limited to a single age group, thus 
eliminating the potential fairness issues that 
age-specific policies raise. Third, because 
youth are particularly susceptible to the ef- 
fects of beverage prices, an increase in excise 
tax would have a larger-than-average effect 
on young drinkers, a group that has higher- 
than-average rates of alcohol-related prob- 
lems. The advantages of a price policy do 
not eliminate the benefits of the minimum 
legal drinking age. LMultiple prevention ave- 
nues are required to achieve substantial re- 
ductions in the major public health prob- 
lems associated with the use of alcoholic 
beverages. 
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